CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INMATES' RIGHT TO CORRESPOND--MCDonough v. Directorof Patuxent, 429 F.2d 1189 (4th Cir. 1970).
William L. McDonough, plaintiff, was convicted of assault and battery in 1959, and sentenced to two years imprisonment by the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County." Subsequently, he was found to be a "defective delinquent" 2 and was committed to Patuxent Institution for an
4
indeterminate period.3 Prior to a second redetermination hearing,
plaintiff contacted several psychiatrists in the fall of 1967 for the purpose of securing private psychiatric evaluations and testimony. 5 Dr.
Thomas Szasz indicated interest in plaintiff's case, advised him that his
fee would be $500 per day, and requested authorization to publish

plaintiff's earlier letters in Playboy Magazine to mitigate expenses
through solicitation of funds from its readers. 6 The Director of Patuxent would not permit plaintiff to mail the authorization and prohibited
7
any further correspondence with Dr. Szasz or Playboy.
Plaintiff instituted suit for the removal of this restriction under
The Civil Rights Act,8 contending "that the purpose of the correspon1 McDonough v. Director of Patuxent, 429 F.2d 1189, 1191 (4th Cir. 1970).
2 MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 5 (1957):

For the purposes of this article, a defective delinquent shall be defined as an
individual who, by the demonstration of persistent aggravated anti-social or
criminal behavior, evidences a propensity toward criminal activity, and who is
found to have either such intellectual deficiency or emotional unbalance, or
both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger to society so as to require such
confinement and treatment, when appropriate, as may make it reasonably safe for
society to terminate the confinement and treatment.
3 429 F.2d at 1191.
4 MD. ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 10(a) (1957) provides in part:
After any person shall have been committed under § 9(b) as a defective
delinquent, shall have been confined for two years after such commitment, ...
such person ... may file a petition requesting that such person be brought before
the court in which such petition is filed for the purpose of having the defective
delinquency of such person redetermined.
5 429 F.2d at 1191.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536, 540 (10th Cir. 1963), describes the statutory prerequisites
to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
(1) Mhat the defendant act "under color of" state or local law, and (2) that
the plaintiff be subjected to a "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
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dence was to seek psychiatric, financial and legal assistance" for his upcoming redetermination hearing.9 During the course of this action, the
Director of Patuxent amended the correspondence prohibition to exclude only letters containing an authorization for the publication of
plaintiff's correspondence "for which. . . institutional approval has not
been granted .... .10 The district judge dismissed the suit," but his
action was reversed by the court of appeals, which stated:
If ... the purpose of his correspondence . . .was to obtain psychiatric, financial and legal assistance for his redetermination hearing, he alleged a good cause of action .... []f... the purpose of
the correspondence was to effect publication of a critique of the
defective delinquency law and its implementation at Patuxent
with deleterious effect upon institutional control and discipline,
treatment programs and other inmates, the administration of the
institution would not be powerless in its discretion to suppress
it.12

Historically, society's desire for retaliation against the convicted

13
criminal furnished the rationale for our system of imprisonment.
Through the influence of nineteenth-century humanitarian concepts,
however, penal philosophy gradually embraced corrective treatment,
reform and rehabilitation as desirable ends to be achieved during in-

carceration. 14 Moreover, society's interest in the prevention of crime
provided reason enough for the furtherance of prison's rehabilitative

function; practically all of those imprisoned would one day return to
free society, changed for the better or for the worse by their experience
of confinement. 15 Yet, the notion of punishment still pervades today's
correctional objectives,16 and uneasily coexists with goals of treatment
17
and rehabilitation.

The origin of present-day barriers surrounding prison communication can be traced to earlier penal practices of restraint, such as the
maintenance of enforced silence among the inmates at all times.' 8 And
even though the doctrine "that a prison is a world by itself, whose in9 429 F2d at 1190.
10 Id. at 1191.
11 Id. at 1190.
12 Id. at 1193.
13 H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 582 (1946); Leopold,
What Is Wrong With The Prison System?, 45 NEB. L. REv. 33, 35-38 (1966).
14 Vogelman, Prison Restrictions-PrisonerRights, 59 J. CRIM. L., C.&P.S. 386 (1968).
15 E. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 441 (3d ed. 1939).
16 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS
17 Id.

2 (1967) (hereinafter cited as 1967

REPORT).

at 4.

is See H.

BARNES &

N. TEETERS, supra note 13, at 521; 1967

REPORT,

supra note 16,
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habitants are not supposed to know anything of what is passing without
its orbit"'19 is defunct, its vestiges remain, notably in the form of censorship of prisoners' mail.
Penal administrators in federal and most state correctional systems
have been delegated authority to regulate inmate conduct, including
20
correspondence, by Congress and the state legislatures respectively.
In the remaining states, prison directors apparently formulate and enforce conduct rules through implied authority.21 Traditionally, through
what has been termed the "hands-off" doctrine, courts have considered
themselves powerless to interfere with the rules and regulations promulgated by prison administrations, leaving the determination of inmates' rights to prison officials' discretion. 22 As the Supreme Court
stated in Price v. Johnston:
Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by
the considerations underlying our penal system.23
Consequently, while judicial intervention to secure the rights of those
imprisoned was "limited to the extreme situation," the independence
24
of penal authorities was preserved.
Recently, courts have begun to recognize that imprisonment does
not demand the automatic surrender of one's constitutional rights, and
have become more willing to assume jurisdiction of these inmate controversies. 25 Under the "retained rights" theory espoused in Coffin v.
19 F. WINES, PUNISHMENT AND REFORMATION 152 (1895), quoted in

H. BARNES & N.

TEETERS, supra note 13, at 585.

20 Jacob, Prison Discipline And Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. Civ. RiGHTs-CIv. Lm. L.
REv. 227, 227 n.1, 235 (1970). See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 4001, 4042 (1964, Supp. IV, 1969); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-81 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. CoRRmc. LAw § 46 (McKinney 1968); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 64-9-2 (Supp. 1968).
21 Jacob, supra note 20, at 235.
22 Vogelman, supra note 14, at 386; Jacob, supra note 20, at 228. See, e.g., Banning
v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954) (courts have no power
to supervise prison administration or to interfere with ordinary prison regulations);
Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1951) (courts have no supervisory jurisdiction over

the conduct of penal institutions); Commonwealth v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168
A.2d 793 (1961) (it is not the court's function to superintend the treatment and discipline
of prisoners).
23 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
24 Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
985, 986-87 (1962). Many recent cases adhere to this traditional view of the court's role.
See, e.g., Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970); Haggerty v. Wainwright, 427
F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1970); Argentine v. McGinnis, 311 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); State
v. Rydzewski, 112 N.J. Super. 517, 271 A.2d 907 (App. Div. 1970).
25 Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law and the Awareness of the Rights of
the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. Rrv. 669, 669-70 (1966).
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Reichard,26 "[a] prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by
law." 2 7 The only express restriction, generally, limits the inmates' freedom of movement, and the question is: "[W]hat other deprivations can
be implied?" 28 According to Coffin, only those restrictions of prisoners'
constitutional rights which can be justified as necessary for the purpose
or function of imprisonment may be imposed. 29 On this basis, then, the
exercise of discretion by prison administrations is more subject to judicial scrutiny. Their decisions regarding restriction of inmates' correspondence may be reviewed, and a denial of freedom of expression may be
redressed.
As in McDonough, the right of an inmate to correspond with the
court and his attorney has generally been recognized.3 0 Other correspondence is frequently governed by very restrictive rules.3 ' Usually,
the content of letters to family, friends, or other approved correspondents is limited to personal matters,8 2 and comment about the institution or its personnel is prohibited.83 The case of Robert Stroud, the
famed Birdman of Alcatraz, furnishes a well-known example of prison
mail censorship, in which the court upheld the authority of the warden
to suppress Stroud's correspondence to secure publication of material
143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
Id. at 445. See also Note, The Problems of Modern Penology: Prison Life and
Prisoners' Rights, 53 IOWA L. REv. 671 (1967).
28 Note, The Right of Expression In Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 407, 410 (1967).
29 Id. at 408.
30 Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951) (warden's refusal to permit
prisoner to file appeal papers in court was a violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment); Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1966) (prisoners
retain the right of access to courts while incarcerated); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp.
863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (right of prisoner to apply to the state court for relief cannot be unreasonably restricted); United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7
(E.D. Pa. 1965) (prison regulations cannot preclude inmates from communication with
the courts); In re Harrell, 2 Cal. 3d 675, 470 P.2d 640, 87 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1970) (prisoners
have the right to correspond confidentially with attorneys and public officials). However,
prisoners' letters to attorneys and courts have been censored and stopped by prison officials,
and their decisions have been upheld by courts in some instances. Singer, Censorship of
Prisoners' Mail and the Constitution, 56 A.B.A.J. 1051, 1054 n.25 (1970). Also it has been
observed that the practice of limiting prisoners' paper supplies to only a few sheets a
week might infringe upon this right: "The preparation of a single habeas corpus petition,
for instance, could exhaust a prisoner's paper supply for months." Hirschkop & Millemann,
The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795, 822 (1969).
31 Leopold, supra note 13, at 49. Provisions are usually made for an "approved mailing list consisting of the names of persons with whom a prisoner may correspond."
Vogelman, supra note 14, at 387.
32 Jacob, supra note 20, at 239.
33 Leopold, supra note 13, at 50.
28

27

NO TES
on ornithology.3

4

Prisoners' letters to governmental agencies, Supreme

35
Court Justices, and even the Pope have been censored and stopped.
And, as in McDonough, curtailment of inmate correspondence with a
national magazine raises a serious question concerning the limits of
freedom of expression in prison.
Restrictions placed upon inmate freedom of expression are, like
any other governmental restrictions, subject to the restraints of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment,8 6 which prohibits "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious" state or federal regulation.3 7 The exercise of governmental power must be "reasonable in relation to its sub-

ject and . .. adopted in the interests of the community .

. . ."

How-

ever, the due process standard does not require that the best or "least
drastic" means of regulation be utilized. 89 Consequently, it would appear that reasonable prison censorship of inmate mail, when uniformly
applied, does not violate this conventional due process standard. And,
courts reviewing inmate correspondence controversies have generally
applied the "due process standard of reasonableness ... irrespective of
what rights have allegedly been violated," and "prisoners' first amendment freedoms have not enjoyed a preferred status. ' 40 Yet, the Supreme Court has characterized first amendment guarantees as preferred
freedoms 41 and "fundamental personal rights and liberties. ' 42 The
Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951).
Singer, supra note 30, at 1054 & nn.27-29.
36 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (the fourteenth amendment prohibits "State
action of every kind," which impairs life, liberty, or property without due process of law).
37 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (governmental regulation of prices
violates due process if found to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to
legislative purposes). See also Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (a statute creating a
conclusive presumption that gifts made within two years of donor's death are made in
contemplation of death found to be arbitrary and in violation of due process); People
v. McClean, 167 Misc. 40, 3 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Middletown City Ct. 1938) (the inclusion of
the phrase "New York World's Fair 1939" on all state license plates held not to be in violation of due process, as only essential and not whimsical rights are protected); Note, 53 IowA
L. REV. 671, supra note 27, at 672-73.
38 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (minimum wage law for
women found not to be an arbitrary discrimination, and not violative of due process).
39 Note, 53 IOWA L. REV. 671, supra note 27, at 672. See also Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. at 537, which states that due process is satisfied when laws have a "reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory."
40 Note, 53 IowA L. REV. 671, supra note 27, at 674 & nn.33-37. Courts differ on
the question of whether the "clear and present danger" doctrine extends to prisons.
Singer, supra note 30, at 1052 n.16.
41 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (dissenting opinion) (city ordinance
requiring licensing for the selling of pamphlets on the street does not infringe upon free
speech or free press).
42 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (an ordinance prohibiting distribution
34
35
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Court has stressed "the importance of preventing the restriction of enjoyment of these liberties ' 43 in the absence of a "clear and present
danger" 44 or a "compelling governmental interest. '45 This more stringent constitutional standard for first amendment guarantees, as applied
to prisoners' correspondence rights, would seem to invalidate a regulation if a reasonable alternative, involving less deprivation of the pris46
oners' freedom of speech, is available.
The administration of Patuxent Institution maintained that the
publication of plaintiff's letters "might have an adverse effect upon institutional control and discipline, the treatment programs available
therein, and, in general, upon the population committed to Patuxent. ' '4T While McDonough upheld plaintiff's right of publication if the
purpose was to obtain psychiatric, financial, and legal assistance, remanding the case for resolution of the issue of fact, they also upheld the
defendant institution's right to suppress correspondence effecting publication of the letters if their content constituted a "critique of the
defective delinquency law and its implementation at Patuxent with deleterious effect upon institutional control and discipline, treatment programs and other inmates." 48 Other courts have similarly justified censorship for the sake of the "orderly administration, '49 compatibility
with "good prison administration," 50 and, in general, for the preservation of authority within the prison.5 ' Penal administrators' basic moof literature on public streets, for the purpose of maintaining clean streets, violates
constitutionally protected right of free speech and free press).
43 Id.
44 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 513 (1951) (advocacy of the forceful overthrow of the government not protected by the first amendment). Accord, Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students wearing armbands in school to
express objection to the Vietnam war are entitled to the protection of free speech);
West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compelling school children
to salute the flag and pledge allegiance to it violates the first and fourteenth amendments).
45 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (statutory provision establishing
residence requirement for welfare assistance impinges upon constitutional right to travel,
and is unconstitutional in the absence of a compelling governmental interest). See also
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (restrictions on first amendment freedoms
justified only if the restriction is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of a
substantial governmental interest); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (restrictions
for the furtherance of a governmental purpose should achieve that end by the least
drastic means available); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (regulations, while
achieving a permissible end, must not unduly infringe upon protected freedoms).
46 See Note, 53 IowA L REv. 671, supra note 27, at 674.
47 429 F.2d at 1192.
48 Id. at 1193.
49 In re Smigelski's Petition, 185 F. Supp. 283, 286 (D.N.J. 1960).
50 Labat v. McKeithen, 243 F. Supp. 662, 664 (E.D. La. 1965).
51 Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 508-09 (1963).
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tives for mail censorship seem to be their fear of escape planning
through unrestricted correspondence and their sensitivity toward criticism. 5 2 It has been suggested that since the prisoners' escape rate in the
federal prison system, which employs one of the most lenient mail censorship systems, has been calculated at less than one percent, it would
not be unreasonable to require prison officials to obtain court sanction,
based on evidence of a possible escape plot, before mail censorship is
permitted. 53 Affirmatively, publication of inmates' letters or manuscripts can provide penal administrators with a barometer of prisoners'
attitudes, progress, and problems, enhancing the prospects of rehabilitation as well as disclosing potential disciplinary risks. 54 Greater inmate
freedom of expression can afford society an opportunity to acquaint itself with inmate life and penal practices,5 5 thus providing the public
with a more enlightened basis for evaluation.
While the orderly management of a prison presents peculiar and
difficult problems of discipline, justification for interference with first
amendment freedoms cannot be found in the assumption that free
speech is inimical to that discipline. Less drastic alternatives should be
devised for the prevention of inmate contraband, while every effort
should be made to insure the place of freedom of expression in the constitutional hierarchy. Prisoner correspondence restrictions, particularly
those relating to mass media as in McDonough, would seem to be remnants of the retributive penal theory which held "that the punishment
56
of a convict is incomplete, so long as his mind is not conquered." Society's goal of crime prevention through resocialization of the inmate
would seem to be foiled by isolation practices that foster social sever52 Jacob, supra note 20, at 239. The sensitivity of prison officials is well illustrated by
their refusal, in one case, to allow an inmate to continue an English correspondence
course. It was learned that he desired to improve his writing for the purpose of authoring
a book describing prison brutality. Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948). In the
present case, an excerpt of a letter published in Playboy in February, 1969, written by
William McDonough, apparently after relaxation of the correspondence ban, gives an
indication of prison criticism:
The guards beat, harass and degrade the inmates until some lose their humanity
entirely and sink into doglike submission . . .. Blackjacks are used in the beatings
and steel bracelets are employed as handcuffs.
PLAYBOY, Feb. 1969, at 57.

See also Hirschkop & Millemann, supra note 30, at 824, which states:
Knowledge of prison problems is withheld from the public, solely on the discretionary authority of the officials who are often the perpetrators of the acts
of which the prisoners seek to complain.
53
54

Singer, supra note 30, at 1055.
Note, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 407, supra note 28, at 410.
at 409.
F. WiNEs, supra note 19, at 152.

55 Id.
5o
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ance and hostility toward the community. 57 And as reasonable alternatives often remain untried, the censorship of mail which prevents an inmate from placing the facts of his case before the public, or prevents
him from informing the public about conditions within the prison,
thus appears violative of the first amendment. Developments suggest,
however, that the vast power of the warden over prisoners' first amendment rights, once secretly exercised in the name of "administrative discretion," is waning as courts become more willing to balance the inter58
ests of internal prison administration against freedom of expression.
Hopefully, recognition of constitutional rights will result, for, as Justice
Frankfurter stated:
The right of a man to think what he pleases, to write what he
thinks, and to have his thoughts made available for others to hear
or read has an engaging ring of universality. 59
Frank T. Flannery
57 See H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, supra note 13, at 598-99; Leopold, supra note 13, at
43; Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270, 1271 (1969).
58 For example, the United States District Court of Rhode Island in Palmigiano v.
Travisono, 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970), recently held that censorship of prisoners' mail
in order to suppress any criticism of the institution violated inmates' first amendment
rights. While recognizing the need to maintain prison security by eliminating traffic in
weapons, drugs and other contraband, the court maintained:
[I]n taking steps to prevent the introduction of such items into the prison, even
though the purpose or end in view is legitimate, prison officials must use means
which are legitimate and which provide the least restrictive of the alternative
methods of accomplishing the desired end.
Id. at 788.
59 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 520-21 (1951) (concurring opinion).

